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WIRE TAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE:
A NEGLECTED CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSIDERATION
BY DONALD B. KING*
Assisted by Marwin A. Batt
"Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by
evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the in-
sidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without un-
derstanding." Louis D. Brandeis.'
Within recent years a number of leading public figures have strongly
advocated the use of wire tapping and electronic surveillance. Others with
equal vigor have raised their voices in opposition to such devices.2 Unfortu-
nately, the passion generated by these arguments has tended to obscure some
of the "understanding" of basic constitutional questions. The opinions of
the Supreme Court have not aided in clarifying this area 3 and yet it is of
utmost importance that these issues be fully comprehended for this great
debate must someday be resolved. The failure to understand them may, in
the words of Justice Brandeis, present the "greatest dangers to liberty."
It is the purpose of this article to point up and elucidate the constitutional
problems involved in these clouded skies and to add a vitally important con-
sideration which has thus far been neglected.
THE BASIC QUESTION PRESENTED
Wire tapping is not a new problem in the United States. 4 However,
modern developments and the availability of electronic devices that may be
used to place an individual under surveillance have added a new dimension
to it, making the need for an answer imperative.5
* Assistant Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law; B.S., Washington State
University; LL.B., Harvard University.
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
2. For a partial list of articles concerning this debate, see appendix to Hearing
Before the Subcommittce on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 1 (1958). (Hereinafter cited as 1958 Hearings.)
3. See pp. 19-24 infra.
4. Even as far back as the Civil War, General "Jeb" Stuart had his own personal
wire tapper. The first prosecution for wire tapping was in 1864 in California. See
DAsH, SCHWARTZ & KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959). (Hereinafter cited as
DAsH.)
5. In the most recent case in this area, Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961), the Court was able to avoid some of the fundamental constitutional problems
by basing its decision on a technicality. See p. 20 infra. Also, the Court's recent deci-
sion in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), regarding the use of illegally obtained
evidence, may have an indirect effect here.
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During the last few years, a number of instruments which can be used
for surveillance have been developed.6 Within this new era may be found
tiny transmitters placed in the pen on the desk, in the telephone receiver or
in the eagle emblem on the wall;7 special microphones to pick up conversa-
tion from the opposite side of the wall or "through open windows hun-
dreds of yards away";8 and special cameras and television transmitters.9 Nor
is it probable that science will be limited to these "phenomena." Experiments
are now being made with certain types of sonic waves which "will make it
possible to overhear everything said in a room without even entering it."' 0
Other instruments for visual surveillance are also being perfected."
Thus far, the thrust of constitutional inquiry has centered around the
fourth amendment and has concerned the use of evidence obtained by wire
tapping and electronic devices against persons accused of crime. While such
issues are significant, it is submitted that the problem is much broader and
goes to a more fundamental aspect of democracy. The considerable techno-
logical advances leave little doubt that Justice Brandeis' prediction of an age
of scientific devices which can expose "the most intimate occurrences of the
home"'12 and furnish the government with the "means of exploring unex-
pressed beliefs, thoughts, and emotions' 3 is much closer. Incredible as it
may seem, some of these modern devices have already been utilized in a
manner characteristic of a "police state."'14 Thus today, democratic society
is urgently confronted with the same question posed by Justice Brandeis
many years ago: "Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection
against such invasions of individual security? ' '15
6. For a recent technical study of these developments, see DASH, op. Cit. supra
note 4, at 305. See also Silverman v. United States, supra note 5.
7. 1958 Hearings, Pt. 1, at 8-20 contains an illuminating discussion of the pos-
sibilities in this area.
8. Silverman v. United States, supra note 5, at 508-509.
9. DASH, op. cit. supra note 4, at 371-378.
10. Supra note 8.
11. Supra note 7.
12. Olmstead v. United States, supra note 1, at 474.
13. Ibid.
14. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954). The facts of this case, as
stated by the Court, are as follows:
On December 1, 1951, while Irvine and his wife were absent from their home,
an officer arranged to have a locksmith go there and make a door key. Two
days later, again in the absence of occupants, officers and a technician made
entry into the home by the use of this key and installed a concealed micro-
phone in the wall. A hole was bored in the roof of the house and wires were
strung to transmit to a neighboring garage whatever sounds the microphone
might pick up. Officers were posted in the garage to listen. On December 8,
police again made surreptitious entry and moved the microphone, this time hid-
ing it in the bedroom. Tw~enty days later they again entered and placed the
microphone in a closet, where the device remained until its purpose of enabling
the officers to overhear incriminating statements was accomplished.
Id. at 130-131. The Court noted that this police action would be "almost incredible if
it were not admitted." Id. at 132.




The landmark case in the area of wire tapping and electronic surveillance,
Olntstead v. United States,'6 was decided by the Supreme Court in 1928.
There, federal officers had gained information of an alleged conspiracy to
violate the National Prohibition Act through the interception of a telephone
conversation without entering upon defendant's premises. The Court, in
granting certiorari, confined itself to the single question of whether the use
of this evidence amounted to a violation of the fourth and fifth amendments.
17
In holding that there was no violation of the fourth amendment, it set forth
the following basic rationale:
(1) There was not an illegal seizure since no "tangible property" of
the defendant was seized.' 8 The "evidence was secured by the use of the
sense of hearing and that only."'19
(2) The use of the telephone by the defendant constituted an "extension
of the voice" beyond the physical boundaries of his premises and hence the
amendment was no longer applicable. The Court specifically noted that he
intended "to project his voice to those quite outside, and that the wires
beyond his house, and messages while passing over them are not within the
protection of the fourth amendment."
20
(3) Since there was no "physical trespass" 21 present, there was no
illegal search. The Court noted explicitly that "there was no entry of houses
or offices of the defendants, '22 and that the wire tapping was done "without
trespassing upon any property of the defendants. '23 It further sustained
this point by noting that the "wires are not part of house or offices any more
than are the highways along which they are stretched.
2 4
The Court, in finding also that there was no violation of the fifth amend-
ment, noted that there was "no evidence of compulsion to induce the defendant
to talk over their many telephones," 2 5 and that they were "voluntarily talk-
ing without knowledge of the interception."
26
Seven years later the Federal Communications Act of 1934, purporting
to prohibit wire tapping, was enacted. 27 With this enactment the emphasis
16. See supra note 1.
17. See supra note 1, at 455.
18. See supra note 1, at 464.
19. Ibid.
20. See supra note 1, at 466.
21. The Court's definition of physical trespass appears to be one involving an
"actual physical invasion of his house or curtilage. See supra note 1, at 466.
22. Olrnstead, supra note 1, at 464.
23. Id. at 457.
24. Id. at 465.
25. Id. at 462.
26. Ibid.
27. 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958).
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of the Court shifted from constitutional questions to ones involving the ap-
plicability of this statute in wire tapping cases. 28 Constitutional issues, how-
ever, still arose in situations involving the use of electronic devices. In these
cases the Court has continued its initial development of the Olmstead ration-
ale. 29 It placed primary emphasis on the "physical trespass" theory.30 Thus
in a case where there was no trespass committed in the use of the electronic
device, the Court has held that there was no violation of fourth amendment
rights.3 1  Conversely, in several cases where trespasses ranged from one
involving secret entry into defendant's home and the planting of microphones
and wires therein3 2 to one concerning the mere intrusion of a "spike-mike"
33
into a row house wall,3 4 the Court found violations of the fourth amendment.
In addition to the rationale used by the majority of the Court in Olmstead
and subsequent cases, various members of the Court have set forth other
theories in their dissents. Clashing directly with the majority is the view
that evidence obtained through wire tapping and electronic devices is an
"unreasonable search and seizure" and hence a violation of constitutional
rights. This argument, which emphasizes the importance of non-physical
factors, has been espoused by dissenters such as Brandeis, 35 Murphy 6 and
Douglas.
3 7
Another position taken is that the use of such evidence in federal pros-
28. Thus there is a long line of cases down to the present day concerned with
problems arising under this statute. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937),
the first of these cases, held that evidence obtained by federal officers in contravention
of the statute was inadmissible in federal courts. In the second Nardone case (Nardone
v. United States), 308 U.S. 338 (1939), the Court held that evidence obtained as a
result of a wire tap was likewise inadmissible in a federal court. The Court in Weiss
v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939), applied the statute to intrastate, as well as
interstate, commerce. In Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952), the Court held
that the statute does not include wire tap evidence in state courts. The Court in
Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957), held that evidence obtained as a result
of wiretapping by state officers is inadmissible in a federal court. In Pugach v. Dol-
linger, 365 U.S. 458 (1961), the Court affirmed the principle set forth in Schwartz v.
Texas.
29. E.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
30. E.g., Irvine v. California, supra note 5.
31. In Goldman v. United States, supra note 29, the Court particularly determined
that there was no physical trespass in connection with the use of the electronic instru-
ment per se.
32. Irvine v. California, supra note 14.
33. Silverman v. United States, supra note 5, at 506; A "microphone with a
spike about a foot long attached to it, together with an amplifier, a power pack, and
earphones."
34. Id. at 507. The facts indicate that the spike intruded several inches into
the wall.
35. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 475 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
36. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 136 (1942) (dissenting opinion).
37. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 762 (1952) (dissenting opinion)
Silverman v. United States, supra note 5 (concurring opinion).
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ecution violates the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 8
It has been said that whereas formerly the only means known to man by
which self-incrimination could be caused were force and violence, now
"subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become
available to the Government. '3 9 Technological advances, it has been asserted,
have "made it possible for the Government, by means far more effective
than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is
whispered in the closet."
'40
Still another rationale has been set forth by Justice Frankfurter. 41 Un-
der this view, the utilization of evidence gained through wire tapping and
electronic surveillance may, in some circumstances, deprive the accused of a
"trial fundamentally fair in the sense in which that idea is incorporated in
due process.
'42
It should be noted that under the rationale which hold the utilization
of such devices is violative of constitutional rights, the evidence obtained
would apparently be inadmissible in a state court, as well as in a federal
court, under the doctrine recently established in Mapp v. Ohio.
43
From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that the rationale in this
area are diverse and numerous. Their validity, however, must be evaluated
in order to gain a better "understanding" of the constitutional problems
involved.
EVALUATION OF RATIONALE
The "tangible property" rationale rests primarily upon the narrow con-
cept that the only things which can be seized are tangible. Yet, if this view
is taken, persons are left with little protection under the fourth amendment.
As Justice Murphy noted in his dissent in the Goldman case:
It is strange doctrine that keeps inviolate the most mundane ob-
servations entrusted to the permanence of paper but allows the
revelation of thoughts uttered within the sanctity of private quarters,
thoughts perhaps too intimate to be set down in a secret diary, or
indeed, utterance about which the common law drew the cloak of
privilege-the most confidential revelations between husband and
wife, client and lawyer, patient and physician, and penitent and
spiritual adviser.
4 4
It would, indeed, seem that the constitution should protect intangibles as
well as items of a material nature if the full benefits of liberty are to be
38. See Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead, supra note 35, at 471; Douglas' dissent in
On Lee, supra note 37, at 762.
39. See supra note 35, at 473.
40. Ibid.
41. Irvine v. California, supra note 14 (dissenting opinion).
42. Id. at 148.
43. Supra note 5.
44. See Goldman v. United States, supra note 29, at 141.
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realized. Man's "spiritual nature," his "feeling" and "intellect" are of equal
if not greater value than more tangible possessions. 45 In viewing later cases,
it now appears that the "tangible property" rationale may be outdated. 46
The "extension of the voice" test is also based on a narrow physical
concept that ignores the basic interest which deserves protection. It would
seem that if the fourth amendment applies to a person's home, offices, and
other private quarters, it also should apply to the telephone which he uses
privately. It is unrealistic to say that the person using the telephone has
projected his voice for interception by government officials. It now appears
that the Court has rejected the "extension of the voice theory.14 7 Unfortu-
nately, however, it has done so in order to permit electronic surveillance and
has not considered the intrinsic values which need to be safeguarded. Hence,
in the Goldman case, 48 the defendant argued that he had not intended his
conversation to go outside of the room. 49 The Court stated that "the dis-
tinction is too nice for the practical application of the Constitutional guarantee
and no reasonable or logical distinction can be drawn between what federal
agents did in the present case and state [sic] officers did in the Olmstead
case."
50
As with those previously mentioned, the "trespass" rationale is also based
primarily upon physical factors. Such a theory, however, makes the protec-
tion of the fourth amendment very narrow. With the modern development
of electronic devices, no physical trespass is needed to intrude upon the pri-
vate expressions and life of the individual. Walls may be penetrated and
distances overcome without a trespass taking place.5 Yet such instruments
may be utilized to provide the listener with the most intimate details of a
private conversation.
The basic fallacy of treating cases where electronic devices have been
45. See Olmstead v. United States, supra note 1, at 478; Goldman v. United
States, supra note 29, at 141.
46. Thus in Silverman v. United States, supra note 5, the Court found an illegal
search and seizure even though no tangible property was seized.
47. See Goldman v. United States, supra note 29.
48. Ibid.
49. Goldman v. United States, supra note 26, at 135.
50. Ibid.
51. A man's actions and words are always exposed to the possibility that
they may be observed or overheard through the employment of the normal
faculties of persons to whom they are not directed-which faculties may in some
instances be rendered effective by common everyday aids to vision and hearing.
The risk is controlled by the construction of the curtilage-such as the choice of
doors, windows, thickness of walls and other safeguards of privacy. . . . But
who can possibly contemplate or anticipate that the insignificant vibrations of
a wall occasioned by ordinary conversation within the privacy of one's own
home will be scientifically seized from without, drawn through the wall and
converted into ... their original spoken form and tenor? Even a stone wall
presents no barrier to the efficacy of a detectaphone. . ..
Reply brief in support of petition for certiorari, p. 4. Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129 (1942).
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utilized without a physical trespass differently from cases where a trespass is
present has been ably brought out by Justice Douglas. 52 In dealing with
these contrasting situations, he has rhetorically posed the question: "Was not
the wrong in both cases done when the intimacies of the home were tapped,
recorded or revealed ?'53 He noted very astutely that "the depth of the
penetration of the electronic device-even the degree of its remoteness from
the inside of the house-is not measure of the injury. . . . [O]ur sole con-
cern should be whether the privacy of the home has been invaded.
'54
The rationale set forth by the dissenters also bears close scrutiny. The
"unreasonable search and seizure" rationale which has been availed of by a
number of the dissenters indicates a recognition of the shrinking freedom of
the individual. A serious weakness exists, however, even within this argu-
ment. The Court, even if it adopted this approach, might later hold that
such intrusions upon the privacy of the individual were justified so long as
a warrant of some type were obtained. Thus, for example, police or govern-
ment officials might obtain a warrant to "search" a home with an electronic
device for a day, week, or month.55 While it conceivably could be argued
that this type of search is an "unreasonable" one which is prohibited by the
fourth amendment 5 6 the majority might believe that the obtaining of the
warrant and the conducting of the search within its terms made it permis-
sible and reasonable in the light of contemporary conditions. Indeed, even
several of the dissenting Justices have indicated that they would not oppose
wire tapping and electronic surveillance under statutes providing for war-
rants. 57 Hence the protection of freedom which is sought could gradually
be eroded away.
Dissents based on the self-incrimination provision of the fifth amend-
ment are cognizant of the fact that some liberty is being taken away. It may
be argued that some of the evidence obtained by electronic devices is not
freely given and is hence self-incriminating. Nevertheless, the narrow inter-
pretation used by the majority would require an element of compulsion which
is not present in these cases. 58 Even if it can be shown, however, that there
52. See Silverman v. United States, supra note 5, at 513.
53. Id. at 513.
54. Ibid.
55. Indeed, § 813-a of the N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROCED. permits an ex parte order to
be issued for as long as two months, with the possibility of renewal on extension.
56. It could be argued that this is similar to the ill-famed Writs of Assistance
used by British officials in Colonial times. For a discussion of this historical back-
ground and spirit of the fourth amendment, see Justice Bradley's opinion in Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). A constructive trespass theory might also be used.
57. See dissent by Murphy in Goldman v. United States, supra note 29, at 140.
There also is some indication that Douglas might not oppose surveillance on such a
basis. See Kamisar, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Professor's View,
44 MINN. L. REv. 891, 913 (1960).
58. See Olmstead v. United States, supra note 25, at 462.
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is a violation of the fifth amendment, the protection gained is not wholly
satisfactory. For example, where immunity is granted5" or where a "waiver"
is found, 60 the fifth amendment affords no protection.
The "fundamentally fair trial" rationale of Justice Frankfurter 6' con-
tains several weaknesses which make it unsatisfactory as a possible deter-
rent to electronic detection. One of these was pointed out by Justice Clark
who observed that such a test lacks predictability in that it is subject to
change with the varying sensitivities of the judges and the changing com-
position of the court.62 He further stated:
We may thus vindicate the abstract principle of due process, but we
do not shape the conduct of local police one whit; unpredictable
reversals on dissimilar fact situations are not likely to curb the zeal
of those police and prosecutors who may be intent on racking up a
high percentage of successful prosecutions."5
There is, however, another unsatisfactory aspect in this rationale which
could eventually cause the destruction of the very underlying freedom which
it has been invoked to protect. Within recent years, the Court has placed
considerable emphasis on the procedural aspects of due process. 64 Under
this standard of "fair trial," the Court might later hold that surveillance into
private beliefs and expressions is permissible if a certain procedure-that of
obtaining a warrant on the consent of a judge of governmental authority-
is followed. Again it may be seen that with such legalized surveillance and
disclosure a fundamental part of our liberty would be lost. 5
Upon close examination, the main fallacy of all of these rationale seems
to be their inability to adequately safeguard individual rights which are so
essential to our society and their failure to give consideration to the basic
freedom involved.
THE BASIC FREEDOM
As indicated the Court has, in the past, been primarily concerned with
constitutional rights under the fourth and fifth amendments. Although it is
true that to some extent "search and seizure" and self-incrimination are
59. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Brown v. Walker, 161
U.S. 591 (1896).
60. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
61. See Irvine v. California, supra note 42. It appears that the majority has never
utilized this rationale since its inception in Rochin v. United States, 342 U.S. 165
(1952), although it has had several opportunities to do so. Indeed, there is some
indication that it may be losing, rather than gaining in favor. See Mapp v. Ohio,
supra note 5, at 666 (concurring opinion).
62. Irvine v. California, supra note 14, at 138 (concurring opinion).
63. Id. at 138.
64. See MASON & BEANEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 511-512 (1954).
65. Thus this rationale would have the same ultimate consequences as the "un-
reasonable search and seizure" theory.
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involved in wire tapping and electronic surveillance, a fundamental constitu-
tional mandate protecting expression has been overlooked. It is submitted
that expression becomes less free and is indirectly curtailed by the fear of
such surveillance.
Freedom of expression is generally protected by the first amendment,
which is made applicable to the states through the fourteenth. 6 Here the
rights of speech, press, religion and assembly are explicitly set forth.67
Generally there has been opportunity to exercise these rights without fear.
One may express his beliefs, thoughts, and opinions freely either in public
or in private conversation with his friends or family. He may say what he
wishes to say, hear what he wishes to hear, write what he wishes to write
and read what he wishes to read. He may worship as he pleases and assemble
with those whom he chooses. Indeed, many phases of an individual's daily
life consist of the exercise of one or more of these rights,6
This expression, highly valued, is made less free and is indirectly
curtailed by the fear of electronic surveillance. The fact that such infringe-
ment is of an indirect nature should make no difference, since the adverse
effect brings about the same result. The roadmarkers laid down by the Court
clearly point to the necessity of striking down indirect restraints on first
amendment freedoms. In Grosjean v. United States,69 for example, the
Court held an indirect curtailment of expression unconstitutional. Six years
later, in the case of Jones v. Opelika,70 Chief Justice Stone noted explicitly
that the commands of the first amendment "are not restricted to cases where
66. There are numerous cases to this effect; e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958); Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958) ; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
(1938) ; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1935), and Glitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
67. U.S. CONST., amendment I:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.
It should be noted that these freedoms are applicable to the states under the fourteenth
amendment (see supra note 66) and are protected against governmental action of a
legislative, judicial, executive, or administrative nature. See e.g., Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U.S. 109, 113 (1934) ; Graig v. Harvey, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) ; Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), and Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123 (1951). It is highly questionable, however, as to whether they would apply
to non-governmental personal wirertapping for private purposes, and legislation may
be necessary to handle this problem. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, under some
circumstances, acts by non-governmental entities have been held to violate rights of
free speech, and many changes may take place in this area of the law in the next decade.
68. Justice Rutledge, in speaking of the first amendment liberties, stated that "in
the everyday business of living, secular or otherwise, these variant aspects of personality
find inseparable expression in a thousand ways. They cannot be altogether parted in
law more than in life." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164-65 (1944).
69. 297 U.S. 233 (1935).




the protected privilege is sought out for attack."'" In Murdock v. Pennsyl-
vania ,72 the Court voided a measure which had an indirect "destructive in-
fluence" 3 upon freedom of speech and religion. The Court, in N.A.A.C.P.
v. Alabama,7 4 found that disclosure indirectly constituted a restraint on con-
stitutional rights. Speitzer v. Randallv5 also bears witness to the Court's
enunciation of such a principle. In Bates v. City of Little Rock, the Court
stated :
Freedoms such as these [speech and association] are protected not
only against the heavy handed frontal attack, but also from being
stifled by more subtle governmental influences.76
In still other cases, members of the Court have spoken out against measures
which tend to "impede . . . communication by hanging threateningly over
creative thought.
'77
It should be especially noted that the Court has not limited these concepts
to any particular freedom within the first amendment. It has struck down
indirect restraints on freedoms of speech, press, religion and assembly. 78 This
would seem correct both from a logical and policy viewpoint. These rights,
all precious, should be accorded protection from measures which would tend
to weaken them seriously by less direct means. Neither has the Court
restricted this principle to any particular type of restraint. The earlier cases
appear to deal primarily with restraints of an economic nature,' 9 but later
ones recognize that restraints of a psychological nature8" may also impair
liberty. In these cases, the Court has recognized the "vital relationship"
71. Id. at 608.
72. 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
73. Id. at 113.
74. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
75. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
76. 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1959).
77. See Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 66 (dissenting opinion).
Impediment of creative thought because of measures such as censorship is well illustrated
by the following:
You would not believe how, from the very commencement of my activity, . . .
the horrible censor question has tormented me! I wanted to write what I felt;
but at the same time it occurred to me that what I wrote would not be permitted,
and involuntarily I had to abandon the work. I abandoned, and went on aban-
doning, and meanwhile the years passed away.
Leo Tolstoy, quoted in CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 241 (1946) ; id.
at 66 n. 6 (dissenting opinion).
78. See Speech: Jones v. Opelika, supra note 70; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, supra
note 72; Speizer v. Randall, supra note 75. Press: Grosjean v. United States, supra
note 66. Religion: Jones v. Opelika, supra note 70; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, supra
note 72. Assembly: N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, supra note 74; Bates v. City of Little Rock,
supra note 76.
79. See Grosjean v. United States, supra note 66; Jones v. Opelika, supra note 70;
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, supra note 72; Speizer v. Randall, supra note 75.




between "freedom" and "privacy."81 This treatment also would seem sound.
If freedoms are to be meaningfully and adequately protected, all types
of measures which indirectly undermine them must be guarded against. If
privacy is taken away, persons may be increasingly reluctant to exercise
their freedoms. The relationship is indeed a vital one.
Thus it can be seen that the Court has recognized that various kinds of
indirect restraints are unconstitutional, including those which are of a
psychological nature. Yet the repressive effect on freedom, created by the
possibility of extensive wire tapping and electronic surveillance, may be even
greater than that found in these other situations. It would seem, on this
basis, that such surveillance would be violative of the first amendment. *
The creation of fear from wire tapping and electronic surveillance, with
its impeding effect on free expression, has been noted by many. For example,
Thurmond Arnold, in criticizing a proposed law which would make wire
tapping evidence admissible in federal courts, stated that "it would create
an atmosphere in which people would be afraid to talk on the phone about
anything. 's2  Even those who have served in law enforcement roles of
importance are cognizant of this adverse effect on free speech. Thomas
McBride, former Attorney General of Pennsylvania, has also noted the inhibit-
ing effect wire tapping has on expression and has stated that "there is not
sufficient good done by it to overcome the harm that is done by that feeling of
loss of freedom of decent people."83 The circuit attorney for St. Louis,
Thomas Eagleton, has noted that the individual's "freedom to communicate"
8 4
is hindered by wire tapping, and urges that the "free exchange of thoughts"
should be "encouraged rather than jeopardized. '8  Mr. Rahill, in a state-
ment submitted to a subcommittee of the judiciary on behalf of the Friends
Committee on National Legislation, has stated:
We believe that the free dissemination of ideas and the ex-
change of honest differences of opinion increase the vitality of a
democracy. We wish to avoid any step which would increase the
fear and timidity that already lead some ...to speak guardedly on
the telephone.8 6
Indeed, it appears that some Congressman may hesitate to talk on matters
of grave importance. 87 An editorial in the Wall Street Journal has pointed
81. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, supra note 74, at 462.
82. N.Y. Times, May 12, 1953, § 6 (Magazine), p. 28, col. 4.
83. 1958 Hearings, Pt.1, supra note 2, at 25.
84. 1958 Hearings, Pt.2, supra note 2, at 259.
85. Id. at 261.
86. Hearings on S. 832, S. 2753, S. 3229 and H. R. 8649 Before a Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 224 (1954) [Hereinafter
cited as 1954 Hearings].
87. 1954 Hearings 92, 224. There is also some evidence that presidential telephone




out that wire tapping "could create an atmosphere in which people would
be afraid to talk on the telephone .... *88 Others, too, have described the
inhibiting effect created by wire tapping and electronic surveillance on free
speech.89 Professor Silving, in a reply to a congressional committee cur-
rently investigating this area, has drawn attention to the fact that "knowledge
or rumor [of governmental wire tapping or eavesdropping] generates an
atmosphere of anxiety which may reach far beyond the actuality or the
frequency of the practice." 90 She notes that such surveillance may affect
those who have nothing to hide and that:
it tends to destroy spontaneity of human relations, indeed, generally
the joy of life, which the fathers of our constitutional thought have
adequately described as pursuit of happiness. Freudian psychology
has shown how fear may affect man's total personality, how its ex-
perience, even incidental, may shape a human life. 91
Her statement also brings out the fact that the Supreme Court has recognized
the evil of an atmosphere where individuals begin to fear the ominous "knock
at the door,"' 92 and points out that the "atmosphere created by admitting
wire tapping and eavesdropping is more frightful, precisely because the wire
tapping and eavesdropping are never heard but always suspected. '9 3
So widespread is the recognition of the adverse effect of surveillance on
expression, that it has found its way into Orwell's 1984, one of the leading
novels of our times.94 The late Judge Frank, in an opinion dealing with the
use of electronic detection devices, 95 made reference to this book and noted
the potential horror of living with the possibility "that every sound you
made was overheard" and "every movement scrutinized."96 Those who
would not, however, look to an imaginary era some twenty years hence
need only turn the pages of history some twenty years back. During these
times, the fear of electronic surveillance caused expression to be seriously
curtailed in the occupied countries of Europe.97 Indeed, the unwritten chap-
ters of Eastern Europe and Russia today may bear witness to such fear.
88. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 19, 1953, quoted in 1954 Hearings, supra note 86, at
256.
89. Guild Reporter, Jan. 13, 1950, quoted in Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem:
An Analysis and Legislative Proposal, 52 COL. L. REV. 165, 189 (1952). Professor
Westin, in the law review article cited, also notes that "many people have developed
'tap jitters'." Id. at 165.
90. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 682 (1959) [Hereinafter cited as
1959 Hearings.]
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
93. Ibid.
94. ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
95. On Lee v. United States, 193 F.2d 306, 316 (1951).
96. Ibid.; see ORWELL, op. cit. supra note 94, at 4.
97. On Lee v. United States, supra note 95.
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In addition to the indirect effect which wire tapping and electronic
surveillance have upon freedom of expression, the direct effect should also be
observed. The inherent need for the secret exercise of first amendment rights
has been impliedly noted by the Court.98 However, the general sacredness
of these rights is so accepted that there is little comment on it. Also, certain
expression is of a traditionally secret nature. This being the case, surveillance
directly prevents this secret expression, and the numerous cases concerning
direct restraints on freedom of expression become applicable. 9
The high value of freedom of mind and thought has been often attested
to by members of the Court. It is said that in applying the first amendment
to the states through the fourteenth amendment:
Included were the . . .right to speak freely, the right to believe
when one chooses, the right of conscience. . . . Today what one
thinks or believes, what one utters and says have the full protection
of the first amendment. . . . When we allow government to probe
his beliefs and withhold from him some of the privileges of citizen-
ship because of what he thinks we do indeed invert the order of
things. 100
Remembering that these first amendment rights "are absolutely indis-
pensable,"'u 0 it has been said that infringement results in "a stultifying con-
fortuity" 0 2 and "standardization of ideas, '"103 and that there can be "no
true freedom of mind if thoughts are secure only when they are pent up.'
10 4
It thus seems that freedom of speech and thought are closely related and
that no government should be able to control the inward workings of the
mind.' 0 5 It has been recognized by the Court that "the right to speak freely
and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is one of the chief distinctions
that set us apart from totalitarian regimes."' 00 Yet it is this very right-the
freedom to think and express oneself privately-which may be drastically
limited by electronic surveillance.
98. See American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950).
99. Note, it is true that in American Communications Assoc. v. Douds, the majority
of the Court upheld the requirement of disclosure by union officials as to membership in
the Communist Party despite the First Amendment. This case is, however, distinguishable.
The disclosure was required only of those persons who wished to extend their activities
outside of their private realm to holding a union office. Even more important, the type
of disclosure was extremely limited, and cannot realistically be compared with the
constant surveillance and extensive disclosure found in "electronic device" cases. Other
cases which may at first appear to indirectly bear on this point such as Wilkinson v.
United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961), are also distinguishable on this latter ground.
100. Spieser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 535 (1958) (concurring opinion).
101. Id. at 530 (dissenting opinion).
102. Id. at 532.
103. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1948).
104. Spieser, supra note 100, at 535 (concurring opinion).
105. Jones v. Opelika, supra note 70, at 618 (dissenting opinion).
106. Terminiello, supra note 103, at 4.
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Fundamental policy considerations also lend support to freedom from
surveillance. Underlying our liberties is the recognition that the develop-
ment and perfection of the individual-not the state-is of paramount im-
portance. 10 7 Indeed, in recent years there has been a growing trend in the
law and in many other fields towards recognizing the importance of enabling
the individual to develop his potential.' 08 Within the overall framework of
our political philosophy, the state is merely an instrument designed to help
man to achieve these ends. 10 9 The danger comes when the state interferes
with the individual and prevents or retards this development. Factors such
as the free expression and the reception of ideas, association with others,
sacred manifestation of beliefs, all aid the individual in his aspirations and
development.
Yet, with the use of electronic devices, these very intimate and secret
expressions of the individual are subject to scrutiny and disclosure. A man's
thoughts, associations, conduct, and development of ideas within his home
or office are subject to surveillance. Expression traditionally sacred and
secret is opened to officers of the state. Thus its normal function is destroyed
and man becomes inhibited in the exercise of his first amendment rights.
Clearly, under these conditions, individuals cannot develop their full poten-
tials.110 Ultimately our entire society must suffer the consequences.
Some, however, would not hold this right absolute. Although they take
the position that "the door barring federal and state intrusion into this area
cannot be left ajar,' they qualify it by saying that it can be "opened only
the slightest crack necessary to prevent encroachment upon more important
interests." 1 2 One must examine the interests here involved.
OTHER INTERESTS
It has been contended by some persons that the use of electronic sur-
veillance by government officers is necessary for law enforcement. More
particularly, several United States attorneys have asserted that wire tapping
107. See Whitney v. Calif., 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (concurring opinion).
108. This goal has been expressed in recent times by certain provisions in the
United Nations Charter (See Preamble and Articles 1, 13, 55, 62 and 68) and by the
Declaration of Human Rights. The underlying philosophy behind this movement has
been well stated by Prof. Lauterpacht: "Inasmuch as freedom means the fullest develop-
ment of the possibilities of human personality, it is not a means of the very highest
order but an end in itself." LAUTERPACHT, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHTS OF
MAN 49 (1945). While the Declaration is not legally binding upon the United States,
it does reflect a moral commitment. In fields such as psychology, sociology and religion
the development of potentialities and self-realization also have received considerable
attention.
109. See supra note 107.
110. See Dykstra, The Right Most Valued by Civilized Man, 6 UTAH L. REV. 305,
307 (1959).




is necessary for national security. 11  For example, former Attorney General
Brownell has stated that:
Communists are subversives and conspirators working fanatically
in the interests of a hostile foreign power .... It is almost impos-
sible to spot them since they no longer use . . . written documents
which will identify them. . . . As a matter of necessity, they turn
to the telephone to carry on their intrigue. The success of their
plans frequently rests upon piecing together shreds of information
received from many sources and many nests. The participants in
the conspiracy are often dispersed and stationed in various strategic
positions in government and industry throughout the country.
Their operations are not only internal. They are also of an . . .
intercontinental character.
1 14
Former Attorney General Rogers has stated that "wire tapping by law
enforcement officials is a necessary concomitant of our present day pursuit
of spies, saboteurs, and other subversives.""15 Other governmental officials
and agencies charged with the task of internal security also have spoken out
in favor of wire tapping.
11 6
Another interest of society is the adequate protection from criminal
activity. A number of high ranking police officials and prosecutors have
contended that wire tapping and electronic eavesdropping is necessary. 17
For example, W. H. Parker, Chief of Police in Los Angeles, has pointed
out that crime is on the rise,"18 and contends that "traditional police tech-
niques are not the answer to this problem-organized crime can be reduced
and stamped out by the police only when knowledge of its methods, person-
alities, and plans produce conviction hazards so great that operation becomes
unlprofitable.""' 9 He also asserted that "crime repression 1 20 can be effectu-
ated through surveillance by electronic devices and wire tapping and that
it "is accomplished through educating criminals to fear not only the police-
man who may be keeping them under surveillance without their knowl-
edge."'121 Parker also has pointed out that crime is often conducted behind
113. For a summary of the positions taken and statements made by various
Attorney-Generals, see Rogers, The Case for Wire Tapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792,.794-796
(1954).
114. Brownell, The Public Security and Wire-tapping, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 195, 201,
202 (1954).
115. Rogers, The Case for Wire Tapping, supra note 113, at 793 (1954).
116. See 1954 Hearings, supra note 86, at 104.
117. Dilworth & Dash, A Wire Tap Proposal, 59 DICK. L. REV. 195 (1955) ; Parker,
Surveillance by Wiretapping or Dictograph: Threat or Protection?, 42 CALIF. L. REV.
727 (1954) ; Silver, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Prosecutor's View, 44
MINN. L. REV. 835 (1960).
118. Parker, supra note 117, at 727.
119. Ibid.




closed doors,'122 and noted for illustration the difficulties of securing evidence
in cases concerning prostitution.12 3 He also calls attention to the fact that
a number of serious crimes committed in Los Angeles have been solved by
electronic devices.
124
Edward Silver, District Attorney for Kings County, New York, has
recently written that:
Our experience shows that the use of the telephone has become so
essential an activity that, eve:n when persons suspect they are being
tapped, we still manage to obtain information which, when cumu-
lated, is of great value. For example, one person on the phone may
say, "Are we meeting as usual on Broadway?"; a second, "Are we
meeting at two o'clock?"; and a third, "Is it at Number 482 ?" With
patience and care, much valuable information is pieced together. 125
Mr. Silver, in acknowledging that wire tapping is primarily used in gambling
and prostitution cases, has stated that gambling is the very "heartbeat of
organized crime"'126 and gives rise to other more serious crimes. 27 Hence,
from the foregoing discussions it can be readily seen that there are various
interests of society clashing.
THE BALANCING OF INTERESTS
The fundamental question arises as to whether the values of free ex-
pression are outweighed by other societal interests. The Court, in dealing
with first amendment rights, has traditionally applied this type of test.'
2s It
should be noted, however, that certain members of the Court would hold the
first amendment freedoms absolute, 129 thus placing them beyond the pale
of any balancing process.
122. Id. at 734.
123. Ibid.
124. Id. at 732-733.
125. Silver, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Prosecutor's View, supra
note 117, at 845.
126. Id. at 843, quoting from a PRESENTMENT OF THE SECOND ADDITIONAL MARCH
1958 GRAND JURY OF THE COUNTY OF KINGS ON EFFECTIVE MEANS OF COMBATTING
VIOLATIONS OF LAWS RELATING To GAMBLING AND POLICE CORRUPTION, 2-3.
127. Ibid.
128. See McKay, A Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1182 (1959). In
particular, see pp. 1193-1203.
129. Black and Douglas seem to be the sole Judges strictly adopting this view.
Black, in his dissent in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (dis-
senting opinion) has stated:
As I have indicated many times before, I do not subscribe to that doctrine
for I believe that the First Amendment's unequivocal command that there shall
be no abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that the men
who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the "balancing" that was to be done in
this field. The history of the First Amendment is too well known to require
repeating here except to say that it certainly cannot be denied that the very object
of adopting the First Amendment, as well as the other provisions of the Bill of
Rights, was to put the freedoms protected there completely out of the area of
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Even where the balancing process is applied, however, the importance
of the first amendment freedoms has been recogized in the various legal
formulas which have been used by the Court. It has been said, for example,
that these rights are "preferred.' 0  Even though this concept has been
attacked by some in recent years,' 3 ' it has been ably upheld by others.3 2 It
has also been said that legislation infringing upon them is subject to close
scrutiny13 3 and must be very narrowly drawn.1 3 4 Other criteria have also
been used to emphasize their importance.13 5  Critics of these formulas and
concepts, however, have failed to realize that they are only verbal symbols
of the basic and underlying policy-a policy which recognizes the extreme
importance of these rights to free men.
Detailed analysis of these conflicting interests of society is necessary for
an adequate understanding in this realm. Since the amount of expression
which is curtailed by wire tapping may differ greatly from that affected by
other electronic devices, it is desirable to weigh them separately against the
interest of the government.'
3 6
The necessity for wire tapping in national security cases has been alluded
to by various Attorney Generals.' 3 7 Despite a number of such general state-
ments by these and other persons concerned with national security, little
any congressional control that may be attempted through the exercise of precisely
those powers that are now being used to "balance" the Bill of Rights out of
existence.
See also Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 261 (1961). For Douglas' position, see
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 285 (1952) (dissenting opinion). See also McKay,
supra note 128, at 1195.
130. For cases and discussion supporting this position, see Cahn, The Firstness of
the First Amendment, 65 YALE L.J. 464 (1956); also McKay, supra note 128.
131. See Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Korvacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949) ; HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 50 (1958) ; Wechsler, Towards Neutral Principles
oj Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 25 (1959).
132. See note 130 supra.
133. McKay, supra note 128, at 1213.
134. E.g., United States v. C.I.O., 335 U.S. 106 at 141 (1947) ; see also Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940)
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) ; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937);
Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
135. Formulas such as the "clear and present danger" doctrine, first set out in
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), or the "grave" and "probable" test, used in
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), are also verbal symbols which serve to
emphasize the importance of first amendment rights. Other language has also been used
by various members of the Court to describe the high value of these freedoms. See
McKay, supra note 128, at 1223 (Appendix).
136. Edward Bennett Williams has expressed this well: "The Eavesdropping
problem is far newer and far graver than the wiretapping problem .... Only occasionally
is there an incident which demonstrates the grim truth to the public-that no conversa-
tion, however confidential is really immune from the threat of a hidden microphone."
See Williams, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Defense Counsel's View,
44 MINN. L. REV. 855, 862 (1960).
137. See supra note 113.
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specific evidence as to the need for wire tapping has been given.138 Professor
Schwartz, formerly with the Justice Department, has noted that:
there never was a showing or a serious attempt to show that we
would catch fewer criminals or that criminal activity would increase
in case of the unavailability of the surveillance devices involved. All
we could prove, and all that ...the current talk of necessity means
is that the prosecution will lose a particular conviction .. .when
it becomes known that an illegitimate detection device has been em-
ployed. This does not prove that future ...cases cannot be found
and successfully prosecuted by more orthodox procedures. . . . A
traitor who risks death ...is certainly not going to be deterred by
the knowledge [that he] may be trapped .... 139
It should be noted that in the recent Coplon case, 140 the federal govern-
ment argued that its wire tap produced no evidence and led to no evidence,
an admission of the lack of any reason for having a wire tap.141 In addition
to the questionable value or necessity for such surveillance, it should be
pointed out that confidential information thus obtained may eventually "leak"
to the newspapers and public.
142
Placed against this interest is the freedom of expression. It should be
noted that the particular expression curtailed by wire tapping is limited to
conversation over the telephone. Nevertheless, the loss of freedom of ex-
pression over the telephone would be very serious in these modern times.'
4
3
As one group has stated, "since Mr. Marconi and Mr. Bell placed at our
disposal those marvelous means for rapid communication, the telephone,
and the telegraph, they have had an important impact on our American
society."' 44 One may communicate with others over vast distances within a
short period of time. Indeed, the entire process of exchanging ideas is made
more efficient through the use of the telephone. Within one's daily life the
telephone may be an important and much used facility of expression.
It has been asserted by some persons, however, that this type of expres-
sion should not be protected by the first amendment because the ancient
practice of eavesdropping has not been considered as a derogation of con-
stitutional rights,'14  and also because the speech may be of a seditious
138. See 1954 Hearings, supra note 86, at 127.
139. Schwartz, On the Current Proposals to Legalize Wire Tapping, 103 U. PA.
L. REV. 157, 1160 (1954).
140. United States v. Coplon, 88 F. Supp. 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), rev'd on other
grounds, 185 F.2d 629 (2d cir. 1950).
141. Williams, supra note 136, at 855.
142. See 1954 Hearings, supra note 86, at pp. 141, 201, 205, 206.
143. For one statement of its significance and varied uses, see 1958 Hearings, Pt. 1,
supra note 2, at p. 3.
144. See statement of Friends Committee on National Legislation, 1954 Hearings,
supra note 86, at 224.
145. Those who take this position fail to recognize the great difference in degrees
between eavesdropping and wire tapping or electronic surveillance. One could protect
his expression from ordinary eavesdropping merely by taking a few precautions such as
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nature. 1 46 Upon closer examination of the contentions, however, it would
appear that they are fallacious.
147
Considering the high value which must be placed upon freedom of ex-
pression and the general lack of specific, concrete evidence that wire tapping
is necessary for national security, it would seem that wire tapping by federal
officers should not be permitted at this time. Nevertheless, it is recognized
that this is a rather close issue and that it may be necessary to allow the
government to wire tap in times of crisis. Any such legislation, however,
should be limited solely to wire tapping and contain certain safeguards.
1 4 8
Other interests of society in law enforcement also should be subjected
to a more detailed examination. While a number of public officials have
made assertions concerning the need for both wire tapping and electronic
surveillance, 149 other persons have vigorously contended that they are un-
necessary for proper law enforcement. Justice Frankfurter, for example, has
viewed electronic surveillance as making "for lazy and not alert law enforce-
ment,' °5 0 and placing a premium on "force and fraud, not on imagination and
enterprise and professional training."'' Professor Moreland, in similar
observation, noted that "it is highly arguable that . . . the evidence can be-
and could have been in the past obtained through the exercise of ordinary,
accepted procedures, combined with a reasonable amount of shoe leather and
legitimate police ingenuity.'1
5 2
It has also been pointed out by opponents of wire tapping that corrup-
tion tends to develop when police are given this power. 15 3 This may take
the form of requiring protection money from criminal organizations. For
example, Dash's study indicates that "illegally operated establishments . . .
exist with the New Orleans police alternately encouraging and harrassing
[by wire tapping] while sharing in their profits."'51 4 In another city it appears
closing a window or door and speaking moderately. Hence there was very little, if any,
curtailment of his freedom of speech. However, this is not the case where there is
wire tapping or electronic surveillance. The speaker cannot take precautions against a
wire tap which may be made some distance from his premises, and it is virtually im-
possible for him to detect it. Against surveillance by electronic devices, there are few
precautions that can be taken. See supra note 51 and p. 37 infra.
146. These persons fail to take into account, however, the fact that the speech of
all persons may be curtailed because of the fear of such surveillance. Also, speech of
innocent parties and speech of a non-criminal nature is directly subjected to surveillance.
1958 Hearings, Pt.1, supra note 2, at 25, 26.
147. See supra notes 145 and 146.
148. A number of safeguards have been proposed. See, e.g., Malin, Is Wire Tapping
Justified?, 300 Annals 29 (1955). Williams, supra note 136, at 868; See generally 1954
Hearings, supra note 86.
149. See supra note 113.
150. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 761 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
151. Ibid. See also PHILLIPS, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 48, 49 (1960).
152. MORELAND, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 148 (1959).
153. See DASH, supra note 4, at 59.
154. 1954 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL CITIZEN INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE OF THE
COMMISSION COUNCIL OF NEW ORLEANS, cited in DASH, id. at 25.
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that police used wire tapping not only for shakedowns, but also to ascertain
the volume of business in order to determine the size of their graft accord-
ingly.'55 Indeed, it appears that:
some of these wire taps ... were authorized by a court order. The
affidavit would contain information sufficient to satisfy the New
York law and the judge, but the facts would be untrue. The
fraudulent applications were used to obtain authority for wire
tapping to aid the plainclothesman in coercing illegal and corrupt
payments from gamblers. 156
In other instances it appears that police officers have used wire tap equip-
ment to gain knowledge for private parties.157
Also it should be noted that the obtaining of a court order may be a
meaningless formality. Thus, the police may merely select a judge who
they know will readily sign such an ex parte order. Dash found in New
York City that the "court order is easily obtained . . ."158 and that "prosecu-
tors quickly learn which judges will be more receptive to their applications,
and consistently take them to these judges. In Manhattan two or three judges
of the Court of General Sessions received most of the district attorney's
business. It is practically unheard of for a judge to fail to grant a wire tap
order for the district attorney."' 159
Even if the judge were to attempt to make this procedure work he
would be faced with considerable difficulties. As previously mentioned, the
facts set forth before the judge may be untrue. 160 Even if not intentionally
falsified, these requests may be made without information' 6 ' and may in
fact represent nothing more than a charge or accusation placed in "factual
terminology."
Not only is the "court order" procedure fraught with considerable
problems, but it also appears that in many instances, the police wire tap
without even applying for such orders. Professor Allan F. Weston, who
has done considerable field work in this area, has testified that "there has
been evidence that there has been, particularly at the police department level,
a good deal of wire tapping without obtaining court orders.' 162 Dash in
his study of New York City concludes that actual wire taps by police must
far exceed those for which warrants are obtained.163 A former telephone
155. DASH, supra note 4, at 55-56.
156. Id. at 55.
157. Id. at 265.
158. Id. at 44.
159. Id. at 45.
160. See supra note 156; see also Westin, supra note 89, at 196.
161. Westin, supra note 89, at 196.
162. 1958 Hearings, Pt.2, supra note 2, at 206.
163. DASH, supra note 4, at 68.
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company employee who had provided police with information in this area
has found that "for every ten legal wire taps installed by plainclothesmen
with court orders, there are ninety illegal taps by plainclothesmen without
orders."1
64
Though the statements of those urging that wire tapping is necessary
for law enforcement deal with crime generally, 165 it appears that such sur-
veillance is primarily used in cases involving gambling and prostitution. 166
In these situations the chance for police corruption would seem to be greater
than in others. Also, the benefits to society obtained through a greater
curtailment of this type of crime than is presently afforded may not be very
great.
Thus we find that the interest of society in law enforcement is less
weighty than it may at first appear. The questionable effect in terms of overall
police efficiency, the problems of corruption which may-and do-arise, the
inherent inadequacies in ex parte court orders, the very real use by police
without obtaining court orders, and the type of crime against which it is
utilized are all factors which detract from the luster and weight of generalized
statements urging the use of wire tapping.
Against this interest is freedom of expression on the telephone. There
can be little doubt of its importance in facilitating the exchange of ideas and
promoting expression.' 67 In weighing the interest of law enforcement, sup-
ported primarily by generalized statements and fraught with numerous dif-
ficulties, against the high value of freedom of expression by telephone, the
latter would seem to prevail. Recognition of the high value of freedom of
expression would place statutes permitting wire tapping under the dark
clouds of unconstitutionality.
The use of electronic devices, as distinguished from wire tapping,
presents a much more serious danger to freedom of expression.6 8  This
freedom of expression which is threatened is not just expression on the
telephone, but expression anywhere at any time. Through electronic sur-
veillance devices planted inside the home and even outside of it, one's
expression is subjected to the scrutiny of governmental officers; office con-
versations may likewise be covered. The cafe on the corner may likewise be
subjected to such surveillance. Even outdoors, the use of parabolic micro-
phones and hidden instruments may prevent free expression. Every object,
from one's car to one's very suit, may have hidden within it instruments
for electronic surveillance. Indeed, virtually all expression becomes sub-
jected to the possibility of this surveillance. The ultimate retreats of the
164. Ibid.
165. See pp. 31-32 supra.
166. DASH, supra note 2, at 65-66.
167. See p. 34 supra.
168. See supra note 136.
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right to express oneself privately are thus overcome. When such a virtually
important freedom is threatened-one which is essential to the dignity and
spiritual growth of the individual-the balancing process should not, in the
opinion of the writer, be applied. Otherwise, our most precious freedom
might eventually be balanced away. While balancing has been used in
ascertaining the validity of various types of statutes and activity which infringe
upon first amendment rights, there must be a point where this process can-
not be applied-a point beyond which the freedom to be protected is so
fundamental to the liberty of the individual that it remains inviolate. Elec-
tronic surveillance goes beyond this point and invades this inviolate area of
constitutional rights.
THE QUESTION ANSWERED
Thus it would seem that the question posed by Justice Brandeis some
thirty-two years ago may be-indeed must be-answered affirmatively. The
Constitution does afford "freedom from surveillance." This great freedom
finds its basis not only in the fourth and fifth amendments, but in the first
amendment as well. Indeed, it is the first amendment which primarily gives
recognition to the basic interests to be protected: freedom of belief, thought,
and expression without fear. Only when these essentials are considered can
a true perspective of the overall problem be gained.
Application of the first amendment would manifest itself in a number
of ways. The constitutionality of statutes authorizing wire tapping on either
federal or state level would have to be tested in terms of the first amend-
ment as well as the other pertinent amendments. 16 9 Only if it were clear
that the interest of the government could not be served adequately in any
other way and that it far outweighs this corresponding loss of freedom would
such a statute meet the test of the first amendment. Wire tapping by govern-
mental officials without such a statute would be a violation of the con-
stitutional rights of the people, and evidence thus obtained would be
inadmissible.
Under the first amendment the use of electronic detection devices would
be prohibited. Here the corresponding loss of freedom of expression would
be too great to allow electronic surveillance. The first amendment would
serve to protect the inviolate rights of private thought and expression
which are so essential to a society based on the liberty of the individual.
This freedom from surveillance, which is manifest in various provisions
of the Bill of Rights, is the answer to the question posed. The guarantee of
the protection of the liberty of the individual, reflected brightly in the first
amendment, is a star in our galaxy of rights which must never become
obscured.
169. Fourth and fifth amendments. It is also possible that the ninth amendment is
applicable. This, however, is a topic in and of itself.
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